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1. Introduction
The neoclassical growth model is a fundamental building block of modern macroeconomics,
yet the transition dynamics predicted by the neoclassical model are strongly at odds with
the experience of many Asian growth miracles, for example, South Korea or Taiwan. These
countries started out with low initial capital stocks, which according to the standard growth
model would imply high initial rates of return to capital and correspondingly high initial
investment rates. Yet most Asian economies that made a successful transition started out
with low initial investment rates that gradually increased over time as shown in Figure 1.
[Figure 1. Investment Rates of Asian Growth Miracles]
For the case of the South Korean economy we argue that two minor modifications of the
neoclassical model can account for most of the capital accumulation pattern observed in the
data since 1960. Our approach builds on recent insights in applied growth economics that
emphasize the role of a large agricultural sector and a high relative price of capital during
the early stages of development.1 We choose the Korean economy for two reasons. First, its
economic growth has been studied extensively as a successful case of economic development.
Second, we have reliable data on the two newly added features—the relative size of the
agricultural and industrial sectors and the relative price of capital—since 1960.
Table 1 summarizes these features of the Korean economy. First, in the early stage of
economic development, agriculture, a sector that does not rely heavily on physical capital,
makes up a significant part of the economy. For example, in 1963 agriculture accounted for
more than 30 percent of Korean GDP and 70 percent of employment. Thus, a low aggregate
capital-output ratio does not necessarily imply a high rate of return to capital. Second, we
note that the relative price of investment goods is high in less developed economies. For
Korea, the relative price of capital in 1963 was more than twice its relative price today. This
feature also reduces the implied rate of return on capital in the early stages of development.
Finally, we note that not only did the aggregate employment rate in Korea increase over
1The two contributions of this literature that are most relevant for our work are Caselli and Feyrer (2007)
and Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2007)
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time, but the shift of employment from agriculture to the nonfarm sector increased the
nonfarm employment rate even more. Thus the marginal product of capital using aggregate
employment also overstates the return to capital.
Our observations for the development path of Korea are consistent with theose of Caselli
and Feyrer (2007) for a cross-section of countries. They show that the size of the agricultural
sector and the relative price of capital are negatively correlated with the level of development,
measured as aggregate per capita output. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) then calculate rates of
return on capital in the nonfarm sector, accounting for differences in the relative price of
capital, and find that this correction substantially reduces the variation of estimated returns
to capital in the cross-section of countries.
Based on these observations we use the growth model to study the transition dynamics of
capital accumulation in the nonfarm sector of the Korean economy. Our approach is based
on Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2007) who study the equilibrium transition from a land-
and labor-intensive agricultural economy to a capital-intensive industrial economy. Whereas
Gollin et al (2007) are interested in the determinants of the allocation of labor between the
agricultural sector and the nonfarm sector during this transition, we take this allocation as
given and study its implications for the capital accumulation path of the nonfarm economy.
We quantitatively assess the role of the declining agricultural sector and the declining price
of capital by calibrating the model economy to the development experience of Korea for
1960-2005. Accounting for these two features substantially reduces the rate of returns to
capital. For example, the implied rate of returns to capital in 1960 significantly decreases
from 90 percent, according to the standard capital-output ratio in a one-sector neoclassical
model, to a still high but more reasonable rate of 15 percent, according to our analysis.
We interpret the transition of the Korean economy as the perfect foresight equilibrium
of our calibrated growth model. Following Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) we intro-
duce ‘wedges’ into the model such that the observed allocation is feasible and optimal. The
wedges are measured total factor productivity, autonomous demand for nonfarm GDP, and
‘financial frictions’ to satisfy the intertemporal optimality condition. We treat these wedges
as exogenous processes, along with other drivers measured from Korean data, such as the
relative price of capital, the nonfarm employment rate, capital income tax rate, the popu-
lation growth rate, etc. We evaluate the impact of each component on the transition by a
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sequence of counterfactual experiments. These experiments suggest that the three most im-
portant contributors to the observed transition of the Korean economy are (1) the increasing
nonfarm employment rate, (2) the declining relative price of capital, and to a lesser extent
(3) the declining financial frictions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature. In
Section 3 we present a modified growth model that distinguishes between a labor-intensive
agricultural sector and a capital-using nonfarm sector. In Section 4 we describe the data for
Korea and how we use them in a way that is consistent with our model. We then calibrate
our model to the Korean economy for the period 1960-2005. In Section 5 we illustrate how
the model-consistent use of the data affects the measured rate of return to capital and total
factor productivity. In Section 6 we compute the counterfactual transition paths to evaluate
the contribution of the different exogenous drivers of growth. Section 7 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Before we proceed with our analysis we briefly summarize how this paper is related to
the literature on economic development from the perspective of the neoclassical growth
model. There is an established literature that studies the properties of transitional capital
accumulation paths in the growth model and to what extent parameterized versions of the
growth model can account for observed transition paths of aggregate per capita output,
especially the Asian ‘growth miracles.’ There is also recent literature that takes a more
disaggregate view of economic development. This literature emphasizes the transition from
a predominantly agricultural economy to a modern industrialized economy and the associated
reallocation of resources.
The standard growth model embodies balanced growth, that is, in the long run per capita
growth is determined by productivity growth. On this balanced growth path (BGP), per
capita capital and output grow at the rate of productivity growth, and the capital-output
ratio and the rate of return on capital remain constant.2 If the economy starts out with a
capital stock that is below its long-run capital stock, the rate of return to capital is high,
2If the relative price of capital is exogenous and changing over time and production is Cobb-Douglas, then
these statements apply to the value of capital, for example, Greenwood,. Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997).
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and the economy is accumulating capital at a relatively faster rate on the transition to the
balanced growth path. Thus capital deepening, that is, an increasing capital-output ratio,
contributes to output growth.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) characterize the transition dynamics of the investment
rate in the optimal growth model with Cobb-Douglas production and constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution preferences. They show that for any given capital coefficient in the
production function there exists a critical value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
such that the investment rate declines (increases) on the transition path if the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is above (below) the critical value.3 The larger the capital coefficient,
that is, the less the rate of return on capital responds to deviations of capital from the BGP,
the higher is the critical value for the elasticity of substitution. For a reasonable calibration
of growth rates and interest rates on the BGP, the critical value of the elasticity is close
to the capital income share. Thus, for a standard calibration of the growth model with a
capital income share of one-third, the critical value for the elasticity of substitution is about
one-third.
The capital income share also determines the speed of transition to the BGP. Empirical
evidence suggests that convergence to the BGP is slow, for example, Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil (1992). Again, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) show that the standard growth model
can account for a prolonged transition path if one assumes large capital income shares, much
larger than measured in the data. One can argue for such large capital income shares based
on a broad concept of capital that also includes human capital and other kinds of intangible
capital. This broad concept of capital then also implies a very high investment rate on the
BGP, and implicitly assumes that measured GDP misses a large fraction of actual output,
namely investment in human capital and other kinds of intangible capital.
Our work complements earlier quantitative research on the role of capital accumulation
for growth. King and Rebelo (1993) provide a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the
transition dynamics in the standard growth model. They show that accounting for observed
post-WWII growth in the United States solely based on capital deepening implies extremely
high real interest rates in the early stages of development, a prediction that appears to hold
3Smetters (2003) shows that if the factor elasticity of substitution in the production function is not unity,
the savings rate can exhibit a non-monotone transition path.
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neither in developed nor developing economies.4
Young (1994, 1995) documents increasing investment rates and the important contribu-
tion of factor input accumulation to growth in the Asian ‘growth miracles.’ Hayashi (1986)
documents the hump-shaped savings rate for Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. Christiano
(1989) shows that a time-varying intertemporal elasticity of substitution due to subsistence
consumption may explain a low savings rate during the early phase of the growth transition.
At low capital/income levels, subsistence consumption can make the intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution extremely low and reduce the incentives for capital accumulation despite
high rates of return. Chen, I˙mrohorog˘lu, and I˙mrohorog˘lu (2006) show that the observed
hump-shaped savings rate in Japan can be accounted for if economic agents perfectly foresee
the relatively high TFP growth in the early 1970s, that is, Japanese households delay their
savings and investment in the 1960s. Gilchrist and Williams (2004) show that the putty-clay
model of production and investment can generate a rising rate of investment and moderate
rates of return to capital that is consistent with the transition period in Japan and Germany.
For a model with two unspecified types of capital, Rappaport (2006) argues that high ad-
justment costs in one sector can lead to transition dynamics with increasing investment rates
even if the sector is small. Papageorgiou and Perez-Sebastian (2006) discuss the possibility
of hump-shaped investment rates in an endogenous growth model with embodied technology
where the lack of human capital delays an adoption of new technology.
More recent literature studies how declining capital goods prices and the transition from
agriculture to industry affects development. Unlike our contribution, most of this work
studies the implications of these features for cross-sections of countries that are on balanced
growth paths. Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) point out that in cross-sectional data, real
investment rates are negatively correlated with the relative price of capital, and that a high
relative price of capital lowers the real capital-output ratio on the balanced growth path.
Hsieh and Klenow (2007) argue that the negative correlation between the relative price of
capital and real income is due to low income countries being relatively less efficient in the
production of capital goods and tradable goods. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) show that in
a cross-section of countries the nonfarm output share appears to be positively correlated
4King and Rebelo (1993) also show that allowing for capital adjustment costs reduces the implied rates of
return to capital but instead implies extraordinarily high values of installed capital during early development.
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with the nominal investment share such that defining the return to capital with respect
to nonfarm output and accounting for the relative price of capital lowers the cross-sectional
variance of the return to capital. Gollin et al (2007) and Duarte and Restuccia (2010) discuss
the implications of sectoral transformation, that is, the transition from a predominantly
agricultural economy to an industrialized economy for aggregate labor productivity. Duarte
and Restuccia (2010) study how changes in sectoral productivity lead to the reallocation of
labor across sectors and changes in aggregate labor productivity. Gollin et al (2007) study
the determinants of the timing of take off, that is, when a developing economy will start
to adopt modern capital-intensive technologies.5 Unlike Gollin et al (2007) and Duarte and
Restuccia (2010), we take the sectoral allocation of labor as given and study its implications
for capital accumulation in the nonfarm sector. Finally, according to our growth accounting,
the financial friction, emphasized by Buera and Shin (2010), played a significant role in the
early stage of economic development in Korea. However, the importance of financial frictions
is limited compared to that of the relative price of capital and the transition from agriculture
since the mid 1970s.
3. Model Economy
Our model of the Korean economy is a modest extension of the standard neoclassical growth
model. To capture the transition from a traditional agricultural economy to an industrialized
economy we adopt a simplified version of Gollin et al (2007) where the agricultural sector
uses labor only.
There is a representative household with constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution
preferences for per capita consumption of a manufactured good, ct, and an agricultural
good, at, and utility is proportional to population size, nt. For simplicity we assume that
the household consumes a fixed per capita amount a¯ of the agricultural good.
∞∑
t=0
βtnt
(
c1−σt − 1
1− σ + a¯
)
, (3.1)
5Ngai (2007) includes the relative price of capital in a model like Gollin et al (2007) and studies its
implications for transition dynamics in some stylized examples.
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with 0 < β < 1 and σ > 0.6 In the following, all variables are expressed in per capita terms.
Household labor supply, et, is exogenous and labor is allocated between the production
of agricultural goods, eat, and manufactured goods, eyt,
eat + eyt = et. (3.2)
The agricultural good is produced using labor as the only input7
at = Aateat, (3.3)
and Aat is labor productivity in the agricultural sector. The manufactured good, yt, is
produced with a Cobb-Douglas production technology using labor and capital, kt, as inputs:
yt = k
α
t (Ayteyt)
1−α , (3.4)
and Ayt is labor-augmenting technical change in manufacturing. In the following we refer to
the agricultural sector as the farm sector and to the manufacturing sector as the nonfarm
sector of the economy.
The nonfarm good is used for private consumption; investment in capital goods, xt; and
public consumption, gt,
yt = ct + qtxt + gt. (3.5)
The price of investment goods in terms of consumption goods, qt, is exogenous and reflects
the marginal rate of transformation between consumption and investment goods. Investment
augments the capital stock,
kt+1 =
nt
nt+1
[(1− δ) kt + xt] , (3.6)
6Gollin et al (2007) consider a slightly more general version where the household’s utility function is
linear in the consumption of the agricultural good if consumption is less than a¯, and of the form (3.1) when
consumption of the agricultural good is a ≥ a¯. We simply assume that the agricultural sector is productive
enough such that in equilibrium the sector provides the fixed per capita consumption amount a¯.
7According to Kim and Park (1985), as quoted in Young (1995), land represents most of the capital input
in Korea’s agricultural sector from 1960 through 1980. According to Pyo (1996) the nonfarm sector used
85% of all equipment and 98% of all structures in 1960.
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and capital depreciates at rate δ. We take a broad view of public consumption and include
not only government purchases, but also net exports. In the following we refer to public
consumption as autonomous demand for goods and take it as exogenous.
We assume that markets are competitive. Wages, wt, and the capital rental rate, ut, are
equal to their marginal products. Aggregate output is defined as
Yt = yt + wtea,t. (3.7)
We allow for the taxation of income at rate τ t, and we assume that the government budget
is balanced through some additional lump sum tax.
We study the perfect foresight equilibrium path of the growth model. The rate of return
on capital is
RKt =
{
(1− τ t+1) ut+1
qt+1
+ [1− (1− τ t+1) δ]
}
qt+1
qt
. (3.8)
The after-tax rate of return for the household consistent with intertemporal utility maxi-
mization is defined by the Euler equation
RHt = β
−1
(
ct+1
ct
)σ
. (3.9)
We allow for a divergence between the rate of return on capital and the rate of return faced
by the household,
RHt = ftR
K
t . (3.10)
We interpret the “wedge,” ft, as representing financial frictions: a fraction 1 − ft of the
returns on capital is diverted by the financial intermediation sector.
In the long run, population is assumed to grow at a constant rate, γn.
8 We also assume
that in the long run productivity in the farm and nonfarm sector and the relative price of
capital change at constant rates γAa , γAy , and γq, and that the employment rate, e, the
autonomous spending share in output, g/y, the income tax rate, τ , and financial frictions,
f , are constant. In particular, following Gollin et al (2007), we assume that productivity in
the agricultural sector is increasing over time, γa > 1. Thus there exists a limiting balanced
8We use γx to denote the growth rate of a variable x.
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growth path where nonfarm output, expenditure components, and capital grow at constant
rates, and all employment is in the nonfarm sector.
For a given time path of nonfarm productivity, Ayt, the relative price of capital, qt,
and the nonfarm employment rate, eyt, we have a stationary transformation for the model.
For this transformation, output and consumption are scaled by zyt and investment and the
capital stock are scaled by zkt,
y˜t ≡ yt
zyt
and zyt ≡ Ayteytq−α/(1−α)t ,
k˜t ≡ kt
zkt
and zkt ≡ Ayteytq−1/(1−α)t .
For the stationary economy, the expressions for the resource constraint, production, capital
accumulation, and intertemporal optimality are rewritten as
y˜t = c˜t + x˜t + g˜t = k˜
α
t , (3.11)
(
zk,t+1
zk,t
)γn,t+1k˜t+1 = (1− δ) k˜t + x˜t, (3.12)
β(
zk,t+1
zk,t
)σ
(
c˜t+1
c˜t
)σ
= ft
qt+1
qt
{
(1− τ t+1)αy˜t+1
k˜t+1
+ [1− (1− τ t+1) δ]
}
. (3.13)
These equations, together with a transversality condition, characterize the perfect foresight
equilibrium of the growth model.
4. Data and Calibration
It is crucial to obtain the data that are consistent with our model. In this section we provide
a detailed explanation on data sources and how we use the data to account for the growth
of the nonfarm sector of the Korean economy. We also describe the calibration procedure.
For the calibration purpose, we assume that by year 2005, the Korean economy was close to
its balanced growth path.
Most of our National Income Account (NIA) data for South Korea are from the Bank of
Korea (BoK). In addition, we use the data on aggregate employment, sectoral employment,
and gross product originating (GPO) from the Groningen Growth and Development Center
(GGDC). Since we are mainly interested in the long-run transition dynamics of the Korean
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economy we remove short-run fluctuations by the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing
parameter of 100.
The annual data from 1953 to 2005 for GDP and its expenditure components (private
and public consumption, investment in equipment and structures), in current prices and
in constant 2000 prices are downloaded from the BoK website. Structures includes both
residential and nonresidential structures. We construct the relative price of investment goods
in terms of consumption goods from the implied BoK price indices. We define total real
investment as the sum of real investment in equipment and structures, and we define the
relative price of total investment as the ratio of nominal and real total investment.
Aggregate employment from 1960 to 2005 is the number of employees from the Total
Economy Data Base, Conference Board (2009). We use sectoral data (agriculture and non-
farm) on persons employed and value-added from 1963 to 2005 from the GGDC 10-Sector
Data Base, Timmer and de Vries (2007).9 Per capita values are expressed relative to the
working age population. Data on the working age population (15 years and older) from
1953-2005 are from the Penn World Table 6.2v1. The participation rate is the per capita
labor supply.
We interpret the actual time paths for observable variables of the Korean economy as
the perfect foresight equilibrium paths of the growth model. Thus, aggregate time series
variables have to satisfy all resource constraints and optimality conditions, Equations (3.4),
(3.5), (3.6), (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10). This has several implications. First, the measure of
real output consistent with our theory is GDP in terms of consumption goods, not the stan-
dard measure of real GDP from the NIAs. Second, since we have separated the agricultural
sector from the rest of the economy and we assume that this sector produces a separate con-
sumption good, the natural interpretation of the agricultural sector’s output is that of food
production. We therefore exclude the consumption of food and alcohol from our definition
of consumption produced by the nonfarm sector.10 Third, we define autonomous spending
as the residual from the NIA expenditure identity for nonfarm GPO after accounting for pri-
9We extrapolate sectoral employment and value added data to the three years prior to 1963 assuming
constant 1963 employment and value added shares.
10In most industrialized economies, distribution accounts for the largest share of the value of food con-
sumption. Thus our correction understates the contribution of the nonfarm sector to consumption, at least
towards the end of the sample. None of our results depend crucially on this correction.
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vate consumption and investment, using Equation (3.5). Thus, our measure of autonomous
spending combines government spending with the value of net exports. Fourth, we construct
the capital stock using the HP-trend values for investment as inputs to the perpetual in-
ventory approach defined by the capital accumulation equation (3.6) and the depreciation
rate.
The capital stock is constructed from the time series of aggregate investment using the
perpetual inventory method. We assume that capital, both equipment and structures, depre-
ciates at rate δ = 0.053.11 Following the convention in the literature, we construct the initial
value of capital stock based on the investment in 1953 and the average growth rate of real
investment during the first 10 years of available data.12 While this is a crude approximation,
it does not have a significant impact on the transition dynamics for 1960 and onward. The
size of initial capital stock is very small and an approxiation error almost disappears by year
1960, the beginning year of our analysis.
The list of ‘observed’ exogenous drivers of the Korean transition from 1960 to 2005
includes the relative price of capital, qt, the nonfarm employment rate, eyt, the capital
income tax rate, τ t, autonomous spending, gt, and the population growth rate, γn,t. In
the introduction we have already pointed to the declining relative price of capital and the
increasing nonfarm employment rate, Table 1. From 1960 on, the relative price of capital
declined by more than a factor of two, and employment in the nonfarm sector increased
significantly. Although the overall employment rate increased by only 10 percent from 48
percent in 1963 to 53 percent in 2005, the nonfarm employment rate more than doubled
from 19 percent in 1963 to 45 percent in 2005. The autonomous spending share increased
almost monotonically from close to zero in 1960 to about 25 precent in 2005. This monotone
increase reflects the combination of a slight increase of the government spending share and
a switch from a current account surplus in the 1960s to a current account deficit in the
mid-1980s. Our measure of the capital income tax rate, the effective marginal income tax
rate from Hyun, Won, and Yoo (2000) for the period 1960 to 1998, does not show a clear
trend. It declines from about 20 percent in 1960 to less than 5 percent in 1980 and then
11This represents a weighted average of standard depreciation rates assumed for equipment, δe = 0.10,
and structures, δs = 0.03 per year, for example, Timmer and van Aark (2002).
12K1953 =
I1953
δ+γI,0−1 where γI,0 is the gross growth rate of investment for the first 10 years.
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rebounds to about 20 percent in 1998. Finally, the population growth rate declines steadily
from a high of 3 percent in the early 1970s to close to 1 percent in 2005.
Per capita output growth on the BGP is determined by the growth rate of labor-
augmenting technical change and the growth rate of the relative price of capital. Since
the gross rate at which the relative price of capital declines seems to be converging to one
we set γq = 1. We take the United States as a reference point for long-run growth and since
average U.S. per capita output growth has been about 2 percent, we set γAy = 1.02. Based
on the evidence for the effective marginal income tax rate, we fix the capital income tax
rate at τ = 0.2 after 2000. Given the observations on Korean population growth, we set
population growth on the BGP at γn = 1.01.
For what we consider to be the relevant definition of output, towards the end of our
sample the total capital stock in the Korean economy is close to three times output. Given
that the relative price of capital is close to one at that time, we set the nominal capital-
output ratio on the BGP at qk/y = 3.0.13 According to Bernanke and Gu¨rkaynak (2001) the
Korean capital income share is relatively stable over time, and the average capital income
share for Korea is α = 0.35. Given the assumptions on depreciation, the capital income
share, the nominal capital-output ratio, and the capital income tax rate we get the implied
rate of return on capital on the BGP, RK = 1.05.
We assume logarithmic preferences, σ = 1, which is consistent with standard parame-
terizations of preferences in business cycle applications of the growth model. Everything
else equal, a lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution, higher σ, would make it easier to
obtain an increasing investment rate on a transition path, Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995).
Using the preference parameter together with the BGP values for consumption growth rate
and the rate of return on capital, we use the household Euler equation to obtain the time
preference parameter β = 0.97.
Our measure of government spending is a residual and includes not only government
spending, but also net exports. We calibrate the BGP value of the government spending
share in a roundabout way, using the transition dynamics to the BGP starting with initial
13For comparison, based on the net capital-stock data from the BEA, the nominal capital-output ratio for
the U.S. has been fluctuating between 2 and 2.5 since the 1950s. Thus our assumption on the BGP value of
the Korean capital-output ratio exceeds the observed long-run value for the U.S.
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conditions for the endogenous and exogenous state variables in 2005. The endogenous state
is simply the observed capital stock in 2005. For the exogenous state variables we assume
that starting in 2005 all exogenous variables converge to their BGP values according to an
AR(1) process with persistence parameter ρ = 0.95. Conditional on the BGP value for
the government spending share we can construct the log-linear approximation of the growth
model. We then choose the government spending share such that in 2005 the log-linear
approximation generates the consumption observed for the Korean economy in 2005.
5. Korea’s Transition
Accounting for the change in the relative price of capital and the size of the nonfarm sector
provides a different perspective on Korea’s transition dynamics. We now evaluate the impli-
cations of these two features for the measurement of capital accumulation, financial frictions,
and productivity improvements.
One of the salient failures of the neoclassical model in accounting for the economic tran-
sition is the rate of return to capital. The rate of return to capital is often measured by the
inverse capital-output ratio. Capital-deepening, that is, an increasing capital-output ratio
is then associated with a declining rate of return to capital. In an economy with a chang-
ing price of capital, the relevant measure of capital deepening is not the real capital-output
ratio but the nominal capital-output ratio, that is, the ratio of nominal capital to nominal
output. The same holds for the investment-output ratio. Furthermore, if capital is mainly
used in the nonfarm sector then the denominator of the capital-output ratio has to be ad-
justed accordingly. In Figure 2.A we plot both, the real and nominal capital-output ratio
when output is aggregate GDP (solid and dashed lines), and the nominal capital-output
ratio when output is nonfarm GDP (dash-dot line). For the period from 1960 to 2005 the
ratio of real capital to real aggregate output increases by a factor of eight, whereas the ratio
of nominal capital to nominal nonfarm output only increases by a factor of three. Thus,
after taking into account the declining relative price of capital and the small initial share of
nonfarm output, the Korean economy’s capital stock in 1960 was substantially closer to its
long-run equilibrium than the usual real capital-output ratio suggests. Similarly, we observe
that the nominal nonfarm investment rate appears to be more stable than the real aggregate
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investment rate, Figure 2.B. But note that even the nominal nonfarm investment rate still
increases from about 20 percent in the 1960s before it stabilizes around 35 percent in the
1970s.
[Figure 2. Capital Accumulation in Korea, 1960-2005]
We now turn to the implications of industrialization and the declining relative price of
capital for the measurement of financial frictions as defined by the growth model. In Figure
3 we plot the time path for various measures of the real rate of return on capital implied
by our calibration of the Korean economy. The rates of return on capital are calculated
using equation (3.8). All measures use the same time path for the capital stock, but they
differ with respect to the definition of the capital-using economy and the treatment of the
relative price of capital and capital income taxes. The top line represents the rate of return
on capital when we use the standard NIA measure of real aggregate GDP (along with q = 1
and τ = 0). This is the measure implied by the aggregate capital-output ratio (the marginal
product of capital) used in most cross-country growth accounting exercises. Based on this
measure we would conclude that the returns to capital in Korea in 1960 should have been
almost 90 percent. Since Korea at that time was mostly an agricultural economy that did
not rely much on physical capital, the aggregate capital-output ratio grossly overstates the
rate of return to capital. The next line depicts the rate of return on capital using real
nonfarm GPO from the NIAs and we see that correcting for the appropriate output measure
reduces the initial rate of return on capital by a third but it still remains at a high rate of
62 percent. Accounting for changes in the relative price of capital further reduces the return
on capital. As of 1960, the implied rate of return is now 18 percent. Finally, accounting
for capital income tax rats further reduces the measured rate of return on capital. In sum,
when appropriate care is taken of the measure of output, the relative price of capital, and
the capital income tax rate, the rate of returns to capital in Korea in 1960 is around 13
percent.
[Figure 3. Rate of Return on Capital in Korea, 1960-2005]
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The assumption that production is Cobb-Douglas has proven to be a useful abstraction
for the analysis of long-run growth. There is some evidence, however, that capital and labor
are complementary in production, for example, Antras (2004). One might therefore think
that conditional on Korea’s low initial nonfarm employment some degree of capital-labor
complementarity would lower the implied rate of return on capital. For the way we calibrate
production this turns out not to be the case. In fact, assuming Cobb-Douglas production
yields lower initial returns to capital than assuming complementarity between capital and
labor. In our calibration the capital coefficient in a CES production function
yt =
[(
1− αCES) (Ayteyt)ρ + αCESkρt ]1/ρ
is determined by the capital-income share and the capital-output ratio on the BGP
αCES = α
(
k
y
)−ρ
.
Substituting this term for the capital coefficient in the expression for the capital rental rate,
that is, the marginal product of capital, we get after some algebra that
uCESt = α
(
k/y
kt/yt
)−ρ
yt
kt
=
(
k/y
kt/yt
)−ρ
uCDt .
Since we start from a capital-output ratio below the BGP value, the initial capital rental
rate increases with the degree of complementarity, ρ < 0.
The household rate of return is implied by the consumption Euler equation (3.9), bottom
line in Figure 3. At the beginning of the sample that rate of return is about 8 percent.
Comparing the model-consistent rate of return on capital with the household interest rate
suggests that in the early 1960s financial frictions might have implied a loss of 5 percent
for households. While this is a significant wedge, it is substantially smaller than the 80
percent we started out with, and the wedge also quickly diminishes to almost zero by the
mid-1980s. We should note that towards the end of the sample the household rate of return
actually exceeds the rate of return on capital. This negative financial friction results from
our calibration of the household’s time preference parameter. We assume that there are no
financial frictions on the BGP, so that the interest rate is equal to the return on capital, and
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the latter is implied by our assumption on the capital-output ratio on the BGP. Given the
assumption on household consumption growth and intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
we then obtain the time preference parameter. There are two alternative calibrations that
avoid negative financial frictions on the sample path. First, we can choose the time preference
parameter such that the financial frictions wedge never exceeds one. This procedure implies
a capital-output ratio of 4.3 on the balanced growth path, which is substantially higher than
the already high capital-output ratio in the current calibration. Second, we can increase the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Both procedures will increase the impact of financial
frictions in the early sample period, but not in any dramatic way. We therefore decided to
stay with our more conventional calibration.
[Figure 4. Total Factor Productivity in Korea, 1960-2005]
Using ‘correct’ measures of output and employment also affects the measured total fac-
tor productivity for the Korean economy, one of the major driving forces of economic de-
velopment. In Figure 4, we plot measures of total factor productivity implied by different
measures of output and employment. All measures use the same capital stock series. For the
first measure, we use total real GDP from the NIAs and total employment, the solid line.
This standard measure indicates that TFP increased by 90 percent from 1960 to 2005. For
the second measure we try to account for the transition to an industrialized economy and
get a measure of nonfarm TFP, dashed line. Our output and labor input measures are real
nonfarm GPO from the NIAs and nonfarm employment. According to this second measure
nonfarm TFP increased by only 10 percent from 1960 to 2005. In fact, for this measure
nonfarm TFP declined from 1960 to 1980 before rebounding, which is somewhat unusal.
From the perspective of the model, however, the relevant measure of nonfarm output is non-
farm output in terms of consumption goods; that is, nominal nonfarm GPO deflated by the
consumption goods price index. This model-consistent measure of TFP, which is used in our
quantitative analysis of Korea, has also increased more or less monotonically from 1960 to
2005, but half as much as the conventional measure of TFP based on aggregate output and
employment.
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6. Counterfactuals
We have recovered three exogenous “wedges”—measures of nonfarm productivity, Ayt; fi-
nancial frictions, ft; and autonomous spending, gt—by interpreting the transition dynamics
of the Korean economy as a perfect foresight equilibrium path. We now study the contribu-
tions of these wedges and other measured exogenous drivers—the relative prices of capital,
qt; nonfarm employment, eyt; capital income taxes, τ t; and population growth, γn—to the
transition dynamics of Korea. For this purpose we construct counterfactual equilibrium
growth paths where we hold these exogenous drivers fixed at their long-run values on the
balanced growth path.
According to these counterfactuals, increasing nonfarm employment had the largest im-
pact on the transition, followed by a declining relative price of capital, and then financial
frictions. Figure 5 plots the transition dynamics of per capita capital, per capita nonfarm
output, and the nominal investment rate for the actual Korean data and four experiments.
For the first experiment (labeled as ‘f ’) we eliminate financial frictions, that is, we set ft = 1
for all periods but keep all other exogenous variables at their observed/constructed values.
Given the initial capital stock in 1960, we then solve the growth model for the perfect fore-
sight equilibrium.14 For the next two experiments, we cumulatively eliminate the effects of
changes in the relative price of capital (labeled as ‘q’) and the nonfarm employment rate
(labeled as ‘ey’) by sequentially fixing each exogenous variable at its BGP value for the en-
tire transition path. For the final experiment, we fix all remaining exogenous variables at
their BGP values (labeled as ‘All’) and calculate the transition that is driven solely by the
deviation of the initial capital stock from its BGP value.
[Figure 5. Counterfactual Transition Paths]
The transition path for the last experiment where all exogenous variables are fixed at their
BGP values corresponds to the typical analysis of the transition dynamics in the neoclassical
growth model. The rapid convergence of per capita output to its BGP is driven by the rapid
14We solve the nonlinear equation system (3.11) through (3.13) for the years 1960 to 2005 for the equilib-
rium capital stock path using the log-linear approximation of the growth model to obtain consumption in
the year 2005 conditional on the state of the economy in 2005.
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rate of capital accumulation, the dashed lines in Figure 5.A and B. The high rate of capital
accumulation is driven by the extraordinarily high return on capital which induces a high
initial investment rate that is declining over time, Figure 5.C. This is the capital accumulation
driven transition dynamics studied by King and Rebelo (1993) and this transition dynamics
is obviously quite different than the one that was observed for the Korean economy, the solid
lines in Figure 5.
Once we allow for the declining relative price of capital and the transition from agri-
culture, financial frictions have a limited impact on the transition of per capita capital and
output after late 1970s. The biggest impact of financial frictions occurs in the late 1960s
when, according to the counterfactual, without financial frictions Korea should have raised
the capita capital by about 40 percent and per capita nonfarm output by 15 percent relative
to their actual values. While these are substantial numbers, the impact of financial frictions
pales in comparison to the effects of a declining relative price of capital and increasing em-
ployment in the nonfarm economy. If the relative price of capital had always been at its BGP
value then in the late 1960s it would have raised capital by an additional 100 percent and
nonfarm output by an additional 40 percent relative to their actual growth path values. If in
addition the transition to an industrialized economy had been immediate and the nonfarm
employment rate had been at its BGP value from the beginning, capital (nonfarm output)
would have been another 140 percent (100 percent) higher relative to the actual growth path
in the late 1960s.
Figure 5.C suggests that financial frictions are in part responsible for the initial low
investment rates in the 1960s. Removing financial frictions increases the average investment
rate in the early 1960s to more than 35 percent and introduces a declining trend starting in
1970. On the other hand, setting the relative price of capital and the nonfarm employment
rate at their respective BGP values from 1960 on has an even bigger impact on the investment
rate. The combined cumulative effect of these three counterfactuals would have been to raise
the investment rate to more than 50 percent in 1960. This pattern of investment is even
more extreme than in the usual exercise where all exogenous variables are fixed at their BGP
values and accounts for the fast transition.
Compared to the effects of nonfarm employment, the relative price of capital, and finan-
cial frictions, the impact of the remaining exogenous variables on the Korean transition is
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minor. The rapid increase of the autonomous spending share until the 1970s has a rather
limited impact on the growth path, in that capital and nonfarm output would have been 5
percent to 10 percent lower if that share had always been at its higher BGP value. Labor-
augmenting technical change plays some role in the latter part of the sample. Since we
assume that TFP growth on the BGP is consistent with long-run TFP growth in the United
States, but measured TFP growth in Korea towards the end of the sample declines, the
counterfactual delivers a higher growth path. Finally, the impact of the remaining exoge-
nous variables, population growth, autonomous spending, and income taxation is small, since
the cumulative impact of fixing the values for financial frictions, the relative price of capital,
nonfarm employment, and TFP growth at their respective BGP values yields a transition
path that is very close to the path when we fix all exogenous variables at their BGP values.
Overall, it is hard to distinguish the differences between these counterfactuals, so we have
omitted them from the graphs in Figure 5.
7. Conclusion
Capital deepening played an important role during the transition of the Korean economy from
an agricultural economy to a modern industrialized economy. While capital accumulation
is a core element of the neoclassical growth model, the model apparently fails to account
for the dynamics of investment rates and the prolonged path of capital accumulation of
the development process in many countries. For the Korean economy we show that this
apparent failure is mainly due to using the “wrong” data to evaluate the model. First, the
neoclassical growth model with its emphasis on capital accumulation applies to the capital-
intensive modern industrialized sector of the economy and not to the more labor-intensive
agricultural sector of the economy. Second, in the early stage of economic development the
relative price of capital is high. Accounting for both features lowers the implied rates of return
to capital during early stages of development and contributes significantly to the relatively
low investment rates. The quantitative analysis based on the calibrated model suggests that
the three most important contributors to the observed transition of the Korean economy are
(1) the increasing nonfarm employment rate, (2) the declining relative price of capital, and
to a lesser extent (3) the declining financial frictions.
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While our model successfully accounts for a prolonged path of capital accumulation, it ab-
stracts from some important features of the transition of the Korean economy. Like in many
other developing economies, the aggregate capital mostly consisted of structure, especially
residential, at the onset of the transition. As a result, the capital-output ratio for equipment
was much lower than for structures. Thus, the implied rates of return and financial frictions
are potentially quite different for the two types of capital. Second, the interaction between
human and physical capital (e.g., capital-skill complementarity in Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-
Rull and Violante (2000)) might be also important for the sluggish accumulation of capital,
as the supply of skilled labor is very limited in the early stage of economic developments.
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Table 1: Transformation of Korean Economy
1963 2005
Size of Nonfarm Economy
Value Added Share 66% 98%
Employment Share 31% 92%
Employment Rate
Aggregate Economy 48% 53%
Nonfarm Economy 19% 45%
Relative Price of Capital 2.3 1.0
Notes: See Section 4 for the detailed explanation about the data.
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Figure 1: Investment Rates For Asian Growth Miracles
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Notes: Data are based on the Penn World Table v6.2.
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Figure 2: Capital Accumulation
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Notes: For “nominal nonfarm,” nominal nonfarm GDP is used for the output measure.
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Figure 3: Implied Rates of Return on Capital
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Notes: For “Nonfarm GDP and q,” nonfarm GDP and the actual time series of relative
price of capital (qt) are used to compute the implied rate of returns to capital. For
“Nonfarm GDP, after tax, and q,” the time series of capital income tax rates (τ t) is used
along with nonfarm GDP and q. “Euler Equation” line reflects the rate of return implied
by the Euler equation for consumption in the model.
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Figure 4: Total Factor Productivity
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Figure 5: Counterfactual Transition Paths
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Notes: The line labeled by “f” denotes the transition path when there are no financial
frictions (ft = 1); “q” denotes the path when the relative price of capital is also constant
(qt = 1) as well as f ; “ey” denotes the path when nonfarm employment is also constant
at its balanced growth path, eyt = ey as well as f and q. “All” denotes the path when all
exogenous variables and wedges are set to their balanced growth path values.
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